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On War and Peace in Cyberspace
- Security, Privacy, Jurisdiction -
by LOTHAR DETERMANN* and KARL T. GUTTENBERG**
The public debate surrounding Edward Snowden's revelations
about NSA spying, and government surveillance in times of war and
peace more generally, is passionate, persistent, utterly unfocused, and
unproductive. Politicians and commentators have pursued various
agendas in the course of this debate, few of which acknowledge the
technological and legal realities of our world today, but rather
acquiesce to a public that is frustrated and eager for action in the
wake of a perceived breach of public trust. These various agendas are
not all "hot air." Indulging public opinion has measurable, serious
consequences that are complicating diplomatic relations and may be
harmful to national and global security, economic cooperation and
development, and ultimately, peace.
Asking governments to stop spying is an illusory undertaking.
But, there are a few topics worthy of discussion and more within
reach. The situation is sufficiently complex and warrants a closer
look at the laws, facts, and myths underlying the current public
debate.
* Lothar Determann teaches Internet, computer, and data privacy law at Freie
Universitat Berlin, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, and practices law as a partner with Baker &
McKenzie, LLP, in Palo Alto.
** Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, former Minister of Defense and former Minister of
Economics & Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany is Chairman and Founder
of Spitzberg Partners, LLC and Distinguished Statesman at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. Opinions expressed herein reflect only
the authors' views, and should not be imputed to their universities, firms, clients, or others.
The authors thank Sarah Barkley, J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, and Brendan Gilmartin, B.A. International Affairs, 2010, The George
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I. NSA SNAFU
In the summer of 2013, Edward Snowden, an employee of the
business and technology consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton,'
leaked classified information about his work on projects for the
United States National Security Agency ("NSA") to various
newspapers, then fled to Hong Kong, and eventually found a safe
haven in Russia.2 Newspaper reports revealed that the NSA collected
vast amounts of information on Internet communications and
international phone calls, including communications of foreign
diplomats and government officials, most notably German chancellor
Angela Merkel.'
Americans and those abroad reacted with outrage, politicians
mobilized to respond to their constituents,' and foreign governments
showed indignation-and some level of hypocrisy.' In the United
States, several lawsuits against the government were filed, including a
class action lawsuit brought by Senator Rand Paul against President
Barack Obama.6 In Europe, the European Parliament threatened to
suspend the United States' access to key portions of the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT")
1. Julian Borger, Booz Allen Hamilton: Edward Snowden's US Contracting firm,
THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/booz-
allen-hamilton-edward-snowden.
2. Borger, supra note 1; James Risen, Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to
Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013 at Al.
3. Karl T. Guttenberg, Merkel's American Minders, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 28,
2013), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/karl-theodor-zu-guttenberg-on-the-
fallout-from-us-spying-on-its-european-allies; Alison Smale, Melissa Eddy & David E.
Sanger, Data Suggests Push to Spy on Merkel Dates to '02, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, at
A4. See also PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT & ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), at 1, available at http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/
default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf.
4. Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, New NSA Leaks show how U.S. is Bugging its
European Allies, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging-european-allies.
5. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, The American spying scandal is no ordinary
diplomatic rift, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 7 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/033a9el2-46ff-
11e3-9clb-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2vTNMOlm2.
6. James Fuller, Rand Paul Files Suit Against Obama, NSA Wednesday, WASH.
POST (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/12/
rand-paul-files-suit-against-obama-nsa-today.
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financial network, free trade negotiations, and the transatlantic U.S.-
8EU Safe Harbor program.
The European Commission is leading the charge to establish a
"European Cloud."' German politicians and companies, including
Deutsche Telekom, are advocating for "email made in Germany" and
even a "German Internet," which would be required by German
federal law to route domestic web traffic through servers located
within Germany.o Chancellor Merkel recently called for the creation
of a "European data network."" Pending trade agreements have
been thrown into jeopardy as well: French President Frangois
Hollande demanded that the United States stop spying
"immediately" and threatened to block negotiations over the
ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
("TTIP"). 12
Hysteria, it turns out, is not confined to Europe. Mere months
after the NSA leak, the Brazilian government awarded a $4.5 billion
fighter jet contract to Swedish manufacturer Saab, despite the fact
7. Stephen Gardner, EU Draft Surveillance Resolution Might End Safe Harbor,
SWIFT Data Sharing Programs, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Jan.
13, 2014, at 97. See Eur. Parl. Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, DRAFT
REPORT on the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens: The Impact of US NSA
Surveillance Programmes & Surveillance Bodies in Various EU Member States on EU
Citizens Fundamental Rights & on EU-US Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice & Home
Affairs, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2013/2188(INI) (2013) (Rapporteur: Claude Moraes).
8. EU Threatens Suspension of Data Deal with U.S., EURACTIv.CoM (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/eu-threatens-suspension-data-dea-news-533093; Plenary
Session Press Release, Eur. Parl., US NSA: Stop Mass Surveillance Now or Face
Consequences, MEPs Say (Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.
eulnews/en/news-room/content/20140307IPR38203/html/US-NSA-stop-mass-surveillance-
now-or-face-consequences-MEPs-say.
9. Neelie Kroes, Making Europe the Natural Home of Safe Cloud Computing,
NEELIE KROES'S BLOG (Nov. 14, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/commission2010-2014/kroes
/en/content/making-europe-natural-home-safe-cloud-computing (Ms. Kroes is the Vice-
President of the European Commission).
10. Leila Abboud & Peter Maushagen, Germany wants a German Internet as Spying
Scandal Rankles, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-
usa-spying-germany-idUSBRE99009S20131025.
11. See Mark Scott, EU Leaders Seek Way to Protect Individuals' Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2014, at B2.
12. Damien McElroy, Bruno Waterfield & Tom Parfitt, Frangois Hollande Tells the
US to Stop Eavesdropping on Europe if it Wants Progress on Trade Deal, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamericalusa
/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-
progress-on-trade-deal.html.
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that Boeing had been the clear leader during the bid process.13 The
switch to Saab was widely reported to be a direct result of "the NSA
problem," which deeply upset Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff.14
Brazil and the European Union are developing an undersea data
cable to circumvent U.S. spying and Brazil is negotiating an "Internet
Constitution" titled the "Marco Civil da Internet," which will include
a local data storage requirement for companies in the country.5
None of the foreign government reactions seem particularly
rational, and each could adversely impact global cooperation and
security. The ubiquitous SWIFT information-sharing network is
trusted everyday by more than 10,000 financial institutions and
corporations in 212 countries to exchange information in a secure and
standardized manner." Following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, a transatlantic information-sharing agreement was struck,
providing the United States Treasury Department with limited access
to SWIFT data, enabling the United States to "follow the money" of
suspected terrorists." Strengthening and monitoring this network has
been a key priority of global anti-terrorism and anti-money
laundering initiatives." The largely symbolic threat to suspend this
arrangement, if realized, could severely jeopardize the ability of the
United States and other governments to track and curb the financing
of international terrorist networks. 9
The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework is a unique international
cooperative program that aims to facilitate the compliance of U.S.
companies with EU data protection laws, and the enforcement of EU
13. Brian Winter, Insight: How U.S. spying cost Boeing multi-billion dollar jet
contract, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-boeing-
brazil-insight-idUSBRE9BJ1P20131220.
14. Alanos Soto & Brian Winter, Update 3-Saab wins Brazil jet deal after NSA spying
sours Boeing bid, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 12/18/
brazil-jets-idUSL2NOJX17W20131218.
15. Angelica Mari, Companies Brace for Brazil Local Data Storage Requirements,
ZDNET.COM (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/companies-brace-for-brazil-local-data-
storage-requirements-7000027092/.
16. SWIFT.COM, Company Information, http://www.swift.com/about-swift/company
_information/company-information?rdct=t&lang=en (last visited, Mar. 9, 2014).
17. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/ 23intel
.html?hp&ex=1151121600&en=18f9ed2cf37511d5&ei=5094&partner=homepage&_r-0.
18. See id.
19. Id.
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data protection laws in the United States by the U.S. government.'
More than 3,000 U.S. companies have voluntarily chosen to
participate in the program, which offers additional legal protections
for Europeans' personal data.2 1 In retreating from the threat,
European Union Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom
later acknowledged that improving the system was preferable to
suspension, and the EU Commission ultimately reaffirmed its support
for the program.22
A "Germany-only Internet" is technologically impractical and
incompatible with EU Common Market law." Similarly, "Europe-
only" or "Brazil-only" clouds would constitute technological regress,
restrict freedom of information and communications within and
between countries, create tensions with World Trade Organization
rules and various free trade agreements, and could ultimately harm
the global economic recovery. These ideas embrace a position of
what can be dubbed "data secessionism" and add to a
"Balkanization" of the Internet. 24
Moreover, neither initiative would reign in government
surveillance. Snowden revealed that European governments operate
intelligence programs similar to the NSA and regularly share
20. See U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR CERTIFICATION WEBSITE, U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Overview, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg-main_018476.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2014);
Brian Hengesbaugh, Amy de La Lama & Michael Egan, European Commission Reaffirms
Safe Harbor & Identifies 13 Recommendations to Strengthen the Arrangement, PRIVACY &
SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Dec. 16,2013; Lothar Determann, International Data
Transfers from Europe & Beyond, 25 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 125,132 (2009).
21. U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR CERTIFICATION WEBSITE, US.-EU Safe Harbor
Overview, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/egmain_018476.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2014);
Id. at U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, http://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (last visited Mar. 18,
2014) (listing all U.S. businesses that have voluntarily sought certification from the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor program).
22. Brian Hengesbaugh, Amy de La Lama & Michael Egan, European Commission
Reaffirms Safe Harbor & Identifies 13 Recommendations to Strengthen the Arrangement,
PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Dec. 16, 2013, at 2073; James
Fontanella-Kahn, Brussels Considers Option to Respond to NSA Spying Scandal, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f4bfla8-470b-11e3-9clb-00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz2wH7IOROO.
23. Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides,
"The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaties." Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (EN) No.
26 of Oct. 2012, art. 26, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 59. See Abboud & Maushagen, supra note 13.
24. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, European Legislators Face "Data Secessionism,"
TECHONOMY EXCLUSIVE (Apr. 1, 2014), http://techonomy.com/2014/04/european-legislat
ors-face-data-secessionism/.
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intelligence with the NSA.25 Sweden, for instance, which seems to
have benefited from the NSA fallout in Brazil by winning the fighter
jet contract intended for Boeing, passed a law in 2008 allowing its
intelligence agency to monitor cross-border email and phone
communications without any court order.26
Given all this outrage, one may wonder why the NSA and similar
agencies around the world gather intelligence in the first place, and
whether such programs might be per se illegal.
II. Why Spy?
Most people consider intelligence a good thing. Informed
governments can make more cognizant decisions.27 Foreign
intelligence gathering has an ancient and storied history. Called
"second-oldest profession," its roots date back thousands of years to
military strategists like Sun-Tzu in China and Chanakya in India.8
Today, most governments gather foreign intelligence by openly
sending diplomats and secretly sending spies abroad.29 Also, due to
the globalization of information and communications networks,
governments are increasingly able to collect intelligence with fewer
agents sent across borders, relying on 'signal intelligence' and cyber
espionage.30
Regardless of how the means of intelligence gathering evolve,
the motivations behind foreign intelligence gathering largely remain
the same. The United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"),
for example, has a mission to "preempt threats and further U.S.
national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters,
producing objective all-source analysis, conducting effective covert
action as directed by the President, and safeguarding the secrets that
25. Julian Borger, GCHQ & European spy agencies worked together on mass
surveillance: Edward Snowden papers unmask close technical cooperation and loose
alliance between British, German, French, Spanish & Swedish spy agencies, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/01/gchq-
europe-spy-agencies-mass-surveillance-snowden; Hubert Gude, Laura Poitras & Marcel
Rosenbach, Mass Data: Transfers from Germany Aid U.S. Surveillance, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelli
gence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html.
26. Borger, supra note 25.
27. See John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International law,
28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 613 (2007).
28. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1072 (2006).
29. John Radsan, supra note 27, at 613.
30. See Borger, supra note 25.
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help keep our Nation safe."' The NSA's "core missions are to
protect U.S. national security systems and to produce foreign signals
intelligence information."32
Germany has an integrated foreign intelligence service, called
the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or ("BND"), while the German armed
forces Bundeswehr maintains its own intelligence service, Amt fir den
Militirischen Abschirrndienst ("MAD"), which is responsible for
military counterintelligence.3 3 The BND describes its mission as
compiling economic, political, and military foreign intelligence on
behalf of the German government, operating in secret and
clandestine ways, but always in compliance with applicable law and in
the interest of Germany's security.3 The British "Secret Intelligence
Service ("SIS"), often known as M16, collects Britain's foreign
intelligence.... SIS provides Her Majesty's Government with a
global covert capability to promote and defend the national security
and economic well-being of the United Kingdom."3
Less is known about the foreign intelligence-gathering agencies
and activities of countries whose political systems tend to be less
transparent. However, the People's Republic of China and Russia,
for example, are very active in foreign intelligence gathering-
particularly with respect to cyberspying.36
So, everybody is doing it-but, is it legal?
31. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov (last visited Feb. 21,2014).
32. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, https://www.nsa.
gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
33. DIE DIENSTSTELLEN DER STREITKRAFrEBASIS, AMT FOR DEN MILITARISCHEN
ABSCHIRMDIENST, http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portalla/
kdoskb/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OyUfL3ylMySlOK
S4hK93MQU_- YJsROUABos3fg!!/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (Office of Military
Counterintelligence website [ all text in German]).
34. See BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST, arbeitsfelder, www.bnd.de (last visited Feb.
23, 2014) (German federal intelligence website [all text in German]).
35. SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE M16, https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2014).
36. In May 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense published a report about Chinese
cyber espionage. Ann. Rep. to Cong.: Military & Security Developments Involving China
(Sec'y of Defense 2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China Report FINAL.pdf.
This followed shortly after a report was issued by private security firm Mandiant
Corporation, which documented a sustained campaign of cyberattacks against over 100
U.S. companies in twenty industries; every one of these attacks emanated from a run-
down office building on the outskirts of Shanghai. See also APT1 - Exposing One of
China's Cyber Espionage Units, Mandiant (2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/
MandiantAPT1Report.pdf. See also Radsan, supra note 27, at 613.
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III. Spying and Punishment of Spies Under International
Versus National Law
The legality of government actions can be scrutinized based on
international and national laws.
Public international law-the law of nations-governs rights and
obligations between countries.37 Generally, sovereign nations retain
the powers of self-governance and do not submit to supranational
authorities that can impose laws on them." Instead, public
international law is created through contracts between countries (also
known as "treaties") and customary international law." Countries
create customary international law through consistent practice in
recognition of a legal obligation to follow the practice.' As a matter
of custom, countries have not accepted any meaningful geographical
limitations on their own jurisdiction to prescribe laws." Many nations
frequently legislate extraterritorially.42 Still, countries tend to
acknowledge that their jurisdiction to execute and adjudicate is
generally limited to their own territory.43
37. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3-4 (8th ed. 2012); LOTHAR DETERMANN, FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATIONS ON
THE INTERNET - CIVIL RIGHTS & STATUTORY LIMITATIONS 133-71 (1999) (German with
English summary).
38. There are exceptions to this general rule. Many nations submit jurisdiction over
specific trade matters to the World Trade Organization. Similarly many countries cede
jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice over international human rights matters.
Finally, the most striking example of an existing supranational legislative body is the
European Union; its twenty-eight member states have ceded jurisdiction in a variety of
broadly defined areas. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (EN) No.
26 of Oct. 2012, art. 1, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47. See also, The Council of Europe Cybercrime
Convention, http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperationleconomiccrime/cybercrime/default
en.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2014); Ian Walden, Law Enforcement Access to Data in Clouds
(forthcoming, 2014).
39. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7); CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 6.
40. See CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 23-24.
41. See id. at 456-57 (discussing the move away from the territorial theory of
jurisdiction in international law); id. at ch. 21 (discussing prescriptive, enforcement, and
adjudicative jurisdiction).
42. For example, jurisdiction under conspiracy and antitrust law is often independent
from territorial boundaries, as are violations of immigration law. Additionally, many
European countries retain jurisdiction over criminal matters if an element of the offense is
committed within the state's borders. CRAWFORD, supra note 37 at 458-59, nn.15-18.
Moreover, many countries have enacted expansive embargoes and extraterritorial trade
sanctions laws. Determann, supra note 40, at 162.
43. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the 1927 Lotus case,
"[Tihe first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-
failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in
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As an exception to the general limitation of executive powers to
a country's own territory, governments have been sending spies to
foreign territories for centuries, and spying has become an accepted
practice as a matter of customary public international law." Most
countries conduct foreign intelligence programs and spy on each
other.45 In this context, the hyped outrage of some governments in
the wake of the NSA revelations does not fall short of a certain irony.
At the same time, most countries have national laws against
espionage, treason, and other acts affecting national security, that
prohibit foreign surveillance against themselves.46 International law
does not prohibit countries from spying abroad or punishing spies at
home.'
Spying in cyberspace does not necessarily require intruding on
foreign territorial sovereignty by sending agents across borders.
Cyberspies typically stay on their home territories. Thus, the impact
of remote espionage on territorial sovereignty is less tangible than
that of sending covert agents across borders. Given that even sending
spies abroad does not violate international law, spying in cyberspace
can hardly raise any international law concerns."
Just as the act of sending a spy is typically permissible under the
sending nation's domestic laws and illegal under the spied-upon
country's domestic laws, intercepting foreign communications and
accessing foreign computers is usually strictly prohibited under the
any form in the territory of another State." The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
44. Chesterman, supra note 28, at 1078, quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI
Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES 655 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646) (sending spies in war is
"beyond doubt permitted by the law of nations"). Only a few countries are known to have
entered into treaties regarding spying and hardly any universally relevant rules on spying
can be found in treaties: In 1947 the United States and Britain signed the United
Kingdom-USA Intelligence Agreement (UKUSA), which was joined by Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand in 1948 to form a "five eyes" alliance on intelligence sharing.
In the 1970s, the USA and the Soviet Union acknowledged intelligence gathering practices
and agreed on limitations regarding counter-intelligence measures. Radsan, supra note 27,
at 595. But see, e.g., Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships & Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM
J. INTL'L L. 53, 67 (1984).
45. Chesterman, supra note 28, at 1072.
46. Radsan, supra note 27, at 604.
47. Id. at 601.
48. Wolfgang Ewer & Tobias Thiene, Volker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche
Aspekte des NSA-Datenskandals, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 30, 32 (2014)
(German law journal article).
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spied-upon country's domestic laws.49 But, simply because one
country's foreign intelligence gathering programs may violate another
country's domestic telecommunications and computer interference
laws, this does not mean these programs are illegal under
international law or the domestic law of the cyberspying country.
Every country's international espionage programs regularly violate
other countries' domestic laws.o
Equally normal is the fact that a captured spy or traitor can be
severely punished as an enemy of the spied-upon state and celebrated
as a hero abroad." "Spies are generally condemned to capital
punishment, and not unjustly; there being scarcely any other way of
preventing the mischief they may do.""
This apparent contradiction-allowing one state to send spies
abroad and another to kill them-is simply a function of the fact that
the spying and spied-upon country's interests are diametrically
opposed and no treaty or benevolent supranational legislature has
resolved the conflict with a rule of law protecting the individuals in
the crossfire. It is no surprise then, that Edward Snowden and
Chelsea Manning (born Bradley Manning) are celebrated abroad yet
face harsh punishments under United States law. Public sentiment or
sympathy in their favor should not be mistaken as proof or even an
indication that the U.S. government acted inappropriately by
international standards with respect to U.S. intelligence gathering.
49. For example, unauthorized access to computers on U.S. territory is punishable by
serious prison terms under the U.S. Computer Fraud & Abuse Act. Lothar Determann,
Internet Freedom & Computer Abuse, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 429 (2013).
50. Chesterman, supra note 28, at 1078, quoting U.S. Intelligence Agencies &
Activities: Risks & Control of Foreign Intelligence, Part V, 94th Cong. 1767 (1975)
(Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to CIA Director ("Espionage is nothing but the
violation of someone else's laws.")).
51. For definitions and distinctions on "spy" and "traitor," see Geoffrey B. Demarest,
Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 332 (1996); Radsan,
supra note 27, at 607.
52. See Chesterman, supra note 28, at 1078 (quoting H. W. HALLECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN
PEACE & WAR 406 (1st ed. 1861)).
53. See id.
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IV. Do European Data Protection Laws Offer Protection
Against Spying?
Conceptually, yes. Practically, no."
European data protection laws originate from a German data
protection law in the state of Hessen that became effective 1970" and
was intended to protect data privacy against the Orwellian vision of
1984." From the outset, European data protection laws were
intended to curtail government surveillance.
In line with European integration, European Union data
protection laws have increasingly taken center stage and dwarfed
similar national laws. Still, EU law does not impose any meaningful
limitations on government surveillance because the EU has limited
jurisdiction over the .foreign intelligence activities of its member
states. Each EU member state maintains its own policies and laws
on domestic intelligence gathering, with varying degrees of privacy
protection afforded to their own citizens." All have enacted
54. See Lothar Determann, Data Privacy in the Cloud: A Dozen Myths & Facts, 28
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 1, 2 (2011).
55. Paul Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions &
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1969 (2013).
56. LOTHAR DETERMANN, DETERMANN'S FIELD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
DATA PRIVACY LAW COMPLIANCE 8 (1st ed. 2012).
57. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, art. 4, 5, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 191. Article
4.2 provides:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of
regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential
State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State,
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each
Member State.
Id. at art. 4.2. See Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan W. Schill, Art. 4 EUV, in E. Grabitz, M.
Hilf & M. Nettesheim, DAS RECHT DER EURPAISCHEN UNION cmt. 34 (1st ed. 2010)
(commentary on Article Four of the Treaty on the European Union) (German). The EU
has published various declarations relating to the limited cooperation in connection with
national security interests. See, e.g., Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.
72, 276, 346, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. C. 326; id. art. 26, PROTOCOL (NO. 21) ON THE POSITION OF
THE UK AND IRELAND IN RESPECT OF THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE.
58. See Paul Schwartz, Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in
Germany, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 289 (2012), Ian Walden, Law Enforcement Access to
Data in Clouds (forthcoming, 2014); and see Ian Brown, Government Access to Private-
Sector Data in the United Kingdom, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 230 (2012). See also Fred
H. Cate, James X. Dempsey & Ira S. Rubinstein, Systematic Government Access to
Private-Sector Data, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 195 (2012); Council of Europe Cybercrime
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legislation to protect their own citizens against foreign espionage by
other countries, including cyberspying. Yet, states can only enforce
these laws within their own territory," which foreign cyberspies do
not typically visit. Consequently, European data protection laws and
other laws cannot offer meaningful protection from foreign
cyberespionage.
While European outrage over a perceived breach of trust is
currently directed at the United States generally and the NSA
specifically, a more appropriate focus of public scrutiny would be the
domestic intelligence services that facilitate the information collection
and sharing privacy advocates so denounce. As long as this
cooperation remains as it has been, existing proposals to create a
more secure method of transmitting electronic communications in
Europe will do little to fill the gaps in existing law.
For instance, European politicians have suggested that the
"European cloud initiative" will offer more robust privacy protection
for their citizens." In reality, data stored and transmitted exclusively
on European territory would not be safer from U.S. cyberspying than
it is in the United States, given the close cooperation between secret
service agencies in the UK (as a member of the so called "Five Eyes"
alliance)" and other member states with the U.S. government. 62 Also,
the United States devotes far greater resources towards military,
intelligence, and counter-intelligence activities than European
governments6 and thus, data in a "European cloud" could be more
susceptible to cyberspying and other threats than data on U.S.
servers.
Convention, http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/default
en.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
59. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7).
60. Danny Hakim, Europe Ains to Regulate the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,2013, at B1.
61. This group was originally formed in 1946 to foster joint cooperation between
Britain and the United States in radio transmission intelligence gathering during World
War II. Today the group is comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada; the three additional countries formally joined the
alliance in 1955. This alliance was formed under the United Kingdom-United States of
America Communication Agreement of 1946 ("UKUSA"), which continues to be the
basis for cooperation between the NSA and the GCHQ. Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes-
Explainer, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02
/history-of-5-eyes-explainer.
62. Borger, supra note 25; Gude, supra note 25.
63. Laicie Heeley, U.S. Defense Spending vs. Global Defense Spending, THE CENTER
FOR ARMS CONTROL & NON-PROLIFERATION (Apr. 24, 2013), http://armscontrolcenter.
org/issues/securityspending/articles/2012_topline globaldefense spending.
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Similarly, the much-hyped (and necessary") EU data protection
regulation cannot be expected to address the issue either. It is
focused primarily on private sector data processing practices and
most drafts continue to carve out EU, EU member states', and
foreign surveillance programs. Moreover, reports suggest the
regulation may probably not be implemented before 2020.6
The ongoing and vocal criticism of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
program also needs to be put into perspective. The EU and U.S.
delegations that negotiated the program specifically agreed at the
outset to carve-outs for law enforcement and government data
processing.7 Neither the EU nor individual EU member states seem
64. Current EU data protection law is based on Directive 95/46/EC - from 1995!
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). See Guttenberg, supra, note 24.
65. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament & of the
Counsel on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data &
on the Free Movement of Such Data § 3.4, COM(2012) 11 final (Jan. 1, 2012) (providing a
detailed explanation of the proposed regulation). Art. 2(2) defines the contemplated
scope of the draft regulation's applicability:
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a)
in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law,
in particular concerning national security; (b) by the Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; (c) by the Member States
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of
the Treaty on European Union; (d) by a natural person without any
gainful interest in the course of its own exclusively personal or
household activity;(e) by competent authorities for the purposes of
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences
or the execution of criminal penalties.
Id. at 40. The EU Parliament proposed to remove the carve-out but does not seem to
contain any Articles specifically geared towards covering surveillance by secret service
organizations. See Inofficial Consolidate Version After Libre Committee Vote Provided by
the Rapporeur, EUR. PARL. & COUNCIL OF THE EU (Oct. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-inofficial-cons
olidated-LIBE.pdf). See also LONDON ECONOMICS, FINAL REPORT TO THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, Implications of the European Commission's
Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation for Business, 2013, available at http://ico
.org.uk/-/media/documents/library/DataProtection/Researchandreports/implications-
european-commissions-proposal-general-data-protection-regulation-for-business.ashx.
66. Privacy Laws & Business - Data Protection & Privacy Information Worldwide,
Delay with EU DP Draft Regulation - Lack of Political Will or Tricky Technical Issue?
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.privacylaws.com/Publications/enews/International-E-news/
Dates/2014/1/Delay-with-EU-DP-draft-Regulation-lack-of-political-will-or-tricky-
technical-issues/ (quoting head of the Polish Data Protection Authority, Dr. Wojciech
Wiewiorowski, with an assessment that "not having a new framework until 2020, is
looking more and more likely"). For a critical assessment, see LONDON ECONOMICS,
supra note 65.
67. Brian Hengesbaugh, Amy de La Lama & Michael Egan, European Commission
Reaffirms Safe Harbor & Identifies 13 Recommendations to Strengthen the Arrangement,
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able or willing to regulate their own intelligence services in the
manner they propose that the NSA be regulated.? If privacy
advocates amongst European politicians truly want reform, they
should first focus on their own country's intelligence gathering and
sharing practices and laws. In this context, they will have to make
tough choices regarding inevitable trade-offs.9
V. Do, Can, Should U.S. Law Offer Protection Against
Spying?
For many of the same reasons laid out with respect to European
data protection laws, it is unrealistic to expect meaningful legal
protection from foreign cyberspying under U.S. law. Like European
laws, U.S. law does not impose significant limitations on foreign
intelligence gathering by the U.S. government on foreign territory.o
But, U.S. law can-and is intended to-protect U.S. citizens against
domestic spying by their own government.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "[tihe right of the people to .be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."" Federal and state laws further protect electronic
communications privacy.72 If law enforcement officers violate
applicable laws or infringe upon an individual's civil liberties, the
government cannot use the illegally gathered evidence in a criminal
proceeding.73 Similarly, the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine bars
PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Dec. 16, 2013, at 2073, 2078;
Determann, supra note 59, at 17.
68. Stewart Baker, Last Chance to Vote for the 2014 Privies-Plus Sebelius v. Reding
for Privacy Hypocrite of the Year, SKATING ON STILTS (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.
skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2013/12/last-chance-to-vote-for-the-2014-privies-plus-
sebelius-v-reding-for-privacy-hypocrite-of-the-year.html.
69. See infra. § 5.A.
70. Radsan, supra note 27, at 616.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007).
72. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2014);
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2014). See, e.g., Susan Freiwald,
Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 1-14
(2004) (discussing the Wiretap Act of 1968 and its role in ensuring that electronic
surveillance by law enforcement officers is conducted in accord with the law).
73. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the Exclusionary Rule
as applicable to federal law enforcement officers); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending the Exclusionary Rule as binding on the states); U.S. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
274, 283-89 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that warrantless government seizure of defendant's
email messages during criminal investigation violated his Fourth Amendment rights).
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the admission of any evidence gathered as a result of such violations. 74
In the wake of the controversies surrounding NSA programs, some
are questioning whether the current laws are sufficient and more
importantly, whether they are being observed." A number of
possible changes are worth considering.
A. Trading Privacy for Security
The most direct response to outrage over government
surveillance would be to demand that governments discontinue or
limit surveillance. Privacy advocates are demanding this, and the U.S.
government is looking at options to make surveillance operations
more targeted." However, at this juncture, we must remember that
we still live in a dangerous world. And because few in the United
States want to completely give up on security or embrace a total
surveillance state, privacy, civil liberties, and security must be
balanced to safeguard the nation. There is no guarantee that even if
the United States limits or stops surveillance, other countries will
automatically follow its lead. To the contrary, many are likely trying
to bolster their activities in an effort to match the United States.
Thus, limiting U.S. surveillance may well reduce the security of
people in the United States and its allied countries, increase their
exposure to surveillance by other countries, and not increase anyone's
net privacy protections. Further, surveillance and privacy discussions
cannot remain limited to the public sector, as tech companies
increasingly acquire vast amounts of data. In a discussion about the
proper balance between these competing interests, we need to be
honest about the trade-offs."
74. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (applying the
exclusionary rule to "fruits of the poisonous tree," or evidence recovered as the result of a
violation of constitutional rights or applicable law).
75. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 3. U.S. courts are
split Compare Jewel v. NSA, No. 08-CV-04373, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008), with ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2013). See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, The Nine Things You Should Know
About the NSA Recommendations From the President's Review Group, ACLU FREE
FUTURE BLOG (Dec. 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-
technology-and-liberty/10-things-you-should-know-about-nsa-recommendations.
76. Richardson, supra note 75; PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD,
supra note 3; Bill Blum, Reining in the NSA, CALIFORNIA LAWYER (Feb. 2014), at 10,
available at http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=933196&wteid=933196_Reinin
in theNSA.
77. On the trade-offs, see Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide:
Competing Visions of the Harm from National Security Surveillance, COLO. TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming 2014).
Summer 2014] WAR AND PEACE IN CYBERSPACE 889
B. Transparent Espionage
Some commentators suggest that increased government
transparency should be the basis of further discussion and cost-
benefit analyses regarding intelligence-gathering program reform."
The probability of achieving this goal seems limited given the
potential adverse impact transparency could have on successful
intelligence gathering and on diplomatic relations among nations, due
to the sensitive nature of intelligence gathering. While transparency
is easier to communicate from a political standpoint, it bears the risk
of populism. Instead, a turn in the opposite direction may be more
promising. Secret services should be kept more secret.
C. Keeping Secret Services More Secret
To a large degree, the foreign government outrage in the wake of
disclosures like Snowden's appear to be stirred up by embarrassment
rather than genuine surprise or concern of the surveillance itself.
Similarly, ordinary citizens would likely be less concerned by foreign
intelligence gathering if the information were kept secret, safe, and
secure. It is alarming that the United States government has been
unable to keep the massive amounts of sensitive information it
collects secure and secret.
Manning, a low-level intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army,79 and
Snowden, a civilian computer technician at a private government
contractor leaked Top Secret information to the media for
publication.' If any one of their thousands of colleagues have been
secretly revealing information to foreign governments, companies, or
others, for financial gain or otherwise, there is cause for serious
concern for individual and national security, as well as for individual
privacy.
In recent years, the United States government has outsourced an
increasing portion of intelligence gathering and analysis duties to
private corporations.8 ' The practice of outsourcing national security
has been the subject of criticism and many are skeptical about the
78. Richardson, supra note 75; PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra
note 3, at 18.
79. Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a
Pivotal Leak of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2013, at Al.
80. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked Data
on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at Al.
81. R.J. Hillhouse, Outsourcing Intelligence, THE NATION (July 30,2007), http://www
.thenation.com/article/outsourcing-intelligence#.
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security risks associated with such an approach." The security of
information stored in the NSA's new data centers has also been
publicly questioned.' The fact that since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has increased spending on
intelligence while simultaneously issuing significant cutbacks in
government agencies, raises concerns regarding increased security
risks created by the security services' insufficiently secure data
handling practices.'
Proponents of intelligence outsourcing point out that security
clearance requirements remain the same in the private sectors as they
are in NSA- and CIA-operated facilities.' At the same time,
computers, networks, and other technology operated by intelligence
agencies have repeatedly fallen victim to insider leaks and hacks by
outsiders, exposing the vulnerability of internally managed
government systems.8 Better data security measures and restrictions
on use and access are needed" to ensure that secure intelligence and
surveillance information is properly protected, but it is not clear
whether insourcing or outsourcing is the right answer.
D. Fences in Cyberspace
Under U.S. law, the CIA is supposed to be focused on foreign
intelligence gathering, whereas the FBI the Department of Homeland
Security and law enforcement authorities are tasked with domestic
security.' Increasingly however, the concepts of "foreign" and
82. Id. (identifying potential vulnerabilities created by outsourcing intelligence to private
corporations); Robert O'Harrow, Jr., The Outsourcing of US. Intelligence Raises Risks Among
Benefits, WASH. POST (June 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
the-outsourcing-of-us-intelligence-raises-risks-among-the-benefits/2013/06/09/eba2\d314-dl4c-
11e2-9fla-la7cdee20287_story.html (suggesting that increased access to top-secret intelligence
information increases the risk of national security leaks); Tim Shorrock, Op-Ed, Put the Spies
Back Under One Roof, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,2013, at A25; N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Prying
Private Eyes, June 20, 2013, at A26; Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy... If We Can't Buy!':
The Privatization of Intelligence & the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental
Functions', 19 THE EUR. J. INT'L L. 1055 (2008).
83. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 75. THE NSA UNCHAINED, https://www.aclu.
org/files/pages/fisainfographic3.pdf (last visited March 21, 2014).
84. O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 82.
85. Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Lipton, Leaker's Employer is Paid to Maintain
Government Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at A12.
86. O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 82.
87. Lothar Determann & Jesse Hwang, Data Security Requirements Evolve: From
Reasonableness to Specifics, 26 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 6,7 (2009).
88. Radsan, supra note 27, at 612. On its home page, the CIA states that the "CIA's
primary mission is to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to
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"domestic" are both meaningless and impossible to separate within
cyberspace and within our globalized economy and information
society. The Internet was conceived to be borderless and global from
the outset." An email sent to a neighbor across the street could be
routed through foreign countries. Thus, any attempt to define or
uphold geographical borders in Cyberspace are futile." U.S. citizens
would not enjoy more privacy if the NSA moved its surveillance
equipment abroad to honor the current statutory distinction between
surveillance on domestic versus foreign territory. Conversely,
German citizens would not be better protected if they limited
themselves to a "Germany-only Internet" while the German secret
service continues its surveillance activities and sharing. Besides, more
and more emails and other communications must be sent abroad due
to necessities in today's global economy. In addition, any
fragmentation into "parallel internets" would lead to enormous
opportunity costs for the private and public sector.
E. Walls Between Defense and Law Enforcement
While public support for NSA surveillance programs continues
to wane,9' most U.S. citizens accept the idea that some form of
government surveillance is necessary in thwarting terrorism, provided
that meaningful limits are placed on programs to protect individual
civil liberties.' Most notably these limits include restriction on
information and evidence sharing between intelligence agencies and
law enforcement agencies.
In recent history, information sharing between federal
intelligence agents and federal law enforcement officers was limited."
assist the President and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating
to national security." https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/todays-cialwhat-we-do (last visited
Apr. 5, 2014).
89. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY,
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-intern
et#JCRL62 (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
90. DETERMANN, supra note 37, at 41-44, 170-71.
91. Susan Page, Poll: Most Americans now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20,2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsa-surveillance/
4638551/.
92. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Few See Adequate Limits on NSA
Surveillance Program: But More Approve than Disapprove (July 26, 2013), available at
http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-survelance-program/.
93. Michael P. Robotti, Grasping the Pendulum: Coordination Between Law
Enforcement & Intelligence Officer Within The Department of Justice in a Post- "Wall" Era,
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 751,776 (2009).
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A proverbial wall between federal agencies was erected under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")-a U.S. statute that
prescribes the ways in which physical and electronic foreign
intelligence gathering and surveillance efforts are conducted.' Law
enforcement agencies restricted information sharing due to concerns
that evidence resulting from data collection for intelligence purposes
could be tainted and thus, inadmissible in criminal proceedings.'
Many within the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")
expressed frustration when their investigations were thwarted by the
presence of what became known as the "FISA wall."9" Perhaps the
most striking example of the negative impact of the FISA wall can be
seen in the 2004 DOJ report, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks."'
The wall was specifically cited as one factor that hindered the
FBI's ability to prevent the September 11 attacks.98 In the months
leading up to the attacks, FBI criminal investigators and intelligence
agents were focused on a number of the same targets.9 In August of
2001, intelligence agents were aware that three suspected terrorists-
two of whom ultimately participated in the September 11 attacks-
had entered the United States." Intelligence operatives opened an
intelligence investigation but did not share surveillance information
with criminal investigators for fear of violating the wall procedures.'0 '
94. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (2014).
95. See Robotti, supra note 96, at 764-66.
96. In a 2006 opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Victoria Toensing, a Deputy
Assistant Attorney General related her experience working for the DOJ while the wall
was in place:
I experienced the pain of terminating a FISA wiretap when to do
defied common sense and thwarted the possibility of gaining
information about American hostages. [During the TWA 847
hijacking] [w]e had a previously placed tap in the U.S. and thought
there was a possibility we could learn the hostages' location. But
[DOJ] career lawyers told me that the FISA statute defined its
'primary purpose' as foreign intelligence gathering. Because crimes
were taking place, the FBI had to shut down the wire.
Victoria Toensing, Opinion, Terrorists on Tap, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2006, at A14,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB113763551855150439.
97. Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the FBI's
Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks 21 (2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbi-911/ [hereinafter DOJ 9/11 Report].
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 223-25.
100. Id. at 349.
101. Id. at 350.
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The FBI's criminal investigation went unresolved and just one month
later the September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out.'"
In the wake of these revelations and the publication of the 9/11
Commission Report, efforts to tear down the wall intensified.'3 In
2002, the government brought a case before the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR") challenging the wall."o
FISCR had never before been convened.' 5 FISCR held that FISA
allows coordination between intelligence and law enforcement
officers, so long as the primary purpose of communication is to obtain
evidence to prosecute foreign spies or terrorists.'*
Revelations during the past year, however, suggest that such
communications are in fact used to prosecute U.S. citizens for crimes
unrelated to espionage: The FBI routinely receives information from
the NSA, and so do other domestic law enforcement agencies." In
August 2013, a special report by Reuters uncovered a secret unit
within the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency known as the Special
Operations Division ("SOD").'" Comprised of representatives from
approximately twenty-five partner agencies, including the FBI, CIA,
NSA, IRS, and Homeland Security, the SOD allegedly funnels
information from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants, and a
massive database of telephone records to authorities across the nation
to aid criminal investigations of U.S. citizens."
In an internal document obtained by Reuters, agents are
instructed to use "normal investigative techniques to recreate the
information provided by SOD" and to specifically omit any mention
of the SOD in investigative reports, affidavits, discussions with
prosecutors and courtroom testimony."o In a subsequent revelation
in October 2013, the New York Times reported that DEA officials
had routine access to an enormous AT&T database containing
102. Id.
103. Radsan, supra note 27, at 612.
104. Robotti, supra note 96, at 789.
105. DOJ 9/11 Report, supra note 97, at 350.
106. Id. at 790.
107. Stewart Baker, Breaking News from August2013: NSA Is Providing 2-3 Tips a Day to
the FBI?, SKATING ON STILTS (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.skatingonstilts.com/ skating-on-
stilts/2014/01/breaking-news-from-august-2013-nsa-is-providing-2-3-tips-a-day-to-the-fbi .html.
108. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up
Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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information on every call passing through an AT&T switch in the last
twenty-six years. "The scale and longevity of the data storage
appears to be unmatched by other government programs, including
the NSA's gathering of phone call logs under the Patriot Act."..
These reports raise concerns regarding disturbing abridgements of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. A careful
look at the wall is warranted.
Re-erecting the wall could have adverse impacts on security.
Yet, it may be one of the few practical ways with a decent chance of
success to protect U.S. citizens' civil liberties against one of the
primary threats to their privacy: namely, the concern that illegally
obtained evidence may be used to prosecute government critics or
otherwise disfavored persons for minor offenses.'12
To be effective, the rules regarding the wall need to be simple
and enforced primarily through audits and supervision of law
enforcement authorities, which tend to be more susceptible to
supervision than the intelligence agencies. A pragmatic solution to
the inherent problems in re-erecting the wall could be to include an
enumerated short list of offenses that warrant information sharing
"through the wall." Like any other statute, such a law would
ultimately be subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, the statute must be carefully and narrowly designed, for
example, by providing that only if U.S. intelligence agents intercept
information that indicates a massive and immediate threat to
domestic security, in the form of mass murder or deployment of
weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence agents could share
information with the FBI or other law enforcement agencies as
necessary to prevent the harm or punish the murderers. Intercepted
information pertaining to drug dealing operations, money laundering
and tax evasion, however, would not be included on such a list and
thus, could not be shared with law enforcement. This approach could
allow the NSA to continue pursuing information gathering programs,
while imposing limitations on the use of intelligence for law
enforcement purposes. This would provide protection for civil
liberties, while preserving the government's ability to protect national
111. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing
N.S.A. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013, at Al.
.112. Radsan, supra note 27, at 612 ("What we fear is something far worse than Richard
Nixon's "enemies list" of those who were to receive extra attention from the Internal
Revenue Service. We fear the dirtiest tricks." Id.); Blum, supra note 79, at 16 (referring to
"widespread unauthorized wiretapping and other illegal activity committed by the FBI as
part of its Cointelpro campaign, intended to disrupt left-wing political groups").
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security in situations where threats of mass destruction and murder
are imminent.
F. Borders Between War Powers and Civil Liberties in Peace
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
government has been suggesting to its citizens that the country is in a
constant state of war."3 War powers have been invoked against
terrorists and other perceived threats to national security.114 The U.S.
has engaged in various semi-official wars and carried out drone
strikes killing U.S. citizens without trials, warrants, or other judicial
proceedings."' In a classified memo that was leaked in February
2013, the U.S. Department of Justice approves killings by drone
strikes in cases of "imminent threats," explaining that "[t]he condition
that an operational leader present an 'imminent' threat of violent
attack against the United States does not require the United States to
have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and
interests will take place in the immediate future.""' This seems
difficult to reconcile with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause,
113. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress & the
Nation (Sept. 20, 2001) full text available at WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_ 092001.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to John Boehner,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, (Sept. 28, 2012) full text with attachments
available at WHITEHOUSE.Gov, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
budget-amendments/oco-designation_09282012.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). See
Michael Hirsh & James Oliphant, Obama Will Never End the War on Terror, NATIONAL
JOURNAL (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/obama-will-never-
end-the-war-on-terror-20140227; John O'Rourke, The World, Post 9/11 BU Faculty &
Staff on What's Changed in Decade Since, BU TODAY (Sept. 2011), http://www.bu.edul
bostonialweb/post-9-11/. U.S. presidents have used the term "war " loosely for decades.
See, e.g., A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (last visited Apr. 2,
2014), www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (discussing
the "war on drugs"); Obama War on Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST (last visited Apr. 2,
2014), www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/obama-war-on-poverty (compilation of articles
regarding the "war on poverty"); Dave Gilson, 109 Things Obama Has Declared War On,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 8, 2012), www.motherjones.com/mixed-media/2012/02/obama-war-
xmas-christians-cheerios (listing various other ideological wars).
114. Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 446,492 (2005).
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Suspect in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2014, at Al.
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against Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news
/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-
americans?lite&preview=true.
896 [Vol. 41:4
which states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.""
The limitations on government powers and processes in war
versus peace must be updated to respond to a new threat landscape
where security risks emanate more from non-state actors, and less
from national governments. At the same time, government war
powers need to remain confined to situations of war-like imminent
threats. This is indispensable to preserve civil liberties."'
G. Privacy Officers for Spies
Under various data privacy laws, organizations are required to
appoint an internal or external data protection officer, an
"ombudsman," who is tasked with monitoring the organization's
compliance with data privacy laws."9 In the wake of 9/11, the U.S.
government recognized the need to create an oversight role focused
specifically on government surveillance programs. To that end, the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB"), an
independent, bipartisan agency, was established to analyze and
review actions the executive branch takes to protect the United States
from terrorism.'20 The goal is to ensure that the need for such actions
is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties, and to
ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies
related to national security and anti-terrorism efforts. 2' The PCLOB
recently published a report on the two NSA programs revealed by
Snowden and found them largely illegal.'22 Moreover, the PCLOB
suggested the involvement of special privacy advocates in court
proceedings about foreign intelligence programs.' 23 In January 2013,
the NSA appointed their first Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer,
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
118. Fisher, supra note 114, at 482, 496; Mazzetti supra note 115, at Al. See Declan
McCullagh, Why Liberty Duffers in Wartime, WIRED (Sept. 24, 2001), http://www.wired.
com/politics/law/news/2001/09/47051?currentPage=all; Rachel Maddow, DRIFT (Crown
Publishers, 1st ed. 2012); GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
(Cato Institute, 1st ed. 2008).
119. Lothar Determann & Christoph Rittweger, German Data Protection Officers &
Global Privacy Chiefs, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 1 (Bloomberg BNA), April 2011, 1.
120. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 3. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee (2014).
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whose job will be "to directly enhance decision making and to ensure
that civil liberties and privacy protections continue to be baked into
NSA's future operations, technologies, tradecraft, and policies.""'
H. Defend or Adjust Privacy Expectations
In the wake of the recent NSA disclosures, privacy advocates
have characterized government surveillance programs as an intrusion
on individual privacy and a breach of public trust. Yet anyone who
takes a close, honest look at the situation will see the NSA is hardly
to blame for Scott McNealy's assessment in 1999 that you have "zero
privacy" on the Internet.125
Any discussion about reforming intelligence collection in the
twenty-first century will need to account for the exponential surge in
influence and resources being accumulated by the private sector.'
Companies have an unprecedented ability to gather, store, aggregate,
and analyze vast amounts of personal data. This shift in power raises
questions regarding what supposedly inherent government functions
will remain strictly within the public domain, including intelligence
collection. Companies and governments will need to find ways to
maintain public trust in the world of big data and disruptive
innovation, as well as develop a new social contract between
themselves and their constituents.
It would be shortsighted, however, to blame companies that are
caught between shareholder mandates, consumer preferences, privacy
laws, and government requests for access to data. As consumers, we
must reconsider our privacy expectations and relative priorities.
While we enjoy free "all-you-can-eat" online services (with cookies),
we cannot reasonably expect, or demand, that law enforcement and
intelligence agencies stay out of cyberspace.
Web 2.0 creates familiarity and strong social interactions that
many missed in the first generation Internet. Online, we are
124. Al Kamen, The NSA has a new, first time ever, privacy officer, WASH. POST (Jan.
28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/01/28/the-nsa-has-a-
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125. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It', WIRED NEWS (Jan. 26, 1999),
http://www. http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (quoting the CEO of
Sun Microsystems, "You have zero privacy anyway ... Get over it."); Helen A. S. Popkin,
Privacy is Dead on Facebook. Get Over It., MSNBC (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/34825225/ns/technologyand science-tech-and-gadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-
get-over-it/#.Uz8AAqldWfV.
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becoming accustomed to merchants who know us like the village
shopkeeper knew our grandparents. Companies create elaborate
user profiles to customize searches, services, information, and
advertisements." As we engage with these services, expand our
online lives, and share personal information in cyberspace, we need
protection from fraudsters, hackers, identity thieves, and terrorists.129
In essence, we need the same security and government protection
online as we do offline.30
Just as we need protection online, we want privacy. But, how
much? Many leading providers tell us-in their service terms, privacy
policies, and in court-that we should not hold privacy expectations.131
When we use "free" (that is, advertising-funded) online services,
including email and social media accounts, we routinely consent that
providers may use and share our personal information "as permitted
by applicable law."132  Also, employees accept intrusive monitoring
and surveillance by employers on a regular basis, particularly in the
United States.133 When we agree to waive privacy rights and
expectations, we act more like shouting information in a crowded
market place than whispering behind closed doors at home-and
government officials may be justified if they view such online
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129. Lothar Determann, Social Media Privacy - 12 Myths & Facts, 2012 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 7,1,8 (2012).
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communications like discussions in public spaces or evidence in plain
view.13
In the United States, telephone users have never enjoyed much
privacy protection with respect to phone connection information
(e.g., who talked to whom, and when).135 Thus, it might not have
occurred to NSA officials that email users should have much higher
privacy expectations in email metadata (who emailed whom, and
when), particularly given the prevalence of service terms that disclaim
privacy expectations.136
If consumers value their privacy and demand that it be respected,
the market can be expected to respond with paid online services that
promise increased security. In turn, government officials may then
have to treat private online communications more like confidential
speech in the sanctity of one's home.
Privacy advocates continue to press the issue. In 2011, a
consumer watchdog group sent mimes to Capitol Hill to illustrate to
U.S. politicians how online tracking could compare to surveillance
offline.17 Online tracking has not stopped, however, and consumers
seem to accept it more readily.138 As long as this trend continues,
government agencies will see little reason for self-restraint and will
continue to freely gather intelligence and evidence in cyberspace, in
war and peace.
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VI. Quo Vadis, NSA, War and Peace in Cyberspace?
In conclusion, it seems the NSA does not break any international
law by operating the massive surveillance programs that Edward
Snowden revealed. No treaties or customary international law have
developed to impose meaningful limitations on spying. Countries
routinely spy on each other in war and peace, in embassies, in covert
operations, and in cyberspace.
The NSA is probably violating myriad foreign countries' laws,
because all countries prohibit foreign spying against themselves. Yet,
this hardly justifies the current outrage abroad. The complaining
countries are running similar programs. Moreover, many actually
actively collaborate with the NSA and other U.S. authorities in the
interest of getting help to protect their own national security. Threats
to suspend free trade negotiations, individual cross-border
transactions, or cooperative programs like SWIFT or the U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor program have counterproductive effects for national
security and privacy. Proposals to nationalize or regionalize email,
the Internet, or cloud computing are technologically impractical and
would be ineffective so long as the various national secret services
collaborate and share information.
EU data protection law does not and cannot protect EU
residents any better from foreign cybersurveillance than U.S. law can
(or does). The great hopes that European politicians are publicly
placing on the EU data protection regulation in this respect are
misplaced not only because current drafts of the regulation do not
even try to regulate surveillance for national security purposes, but
also because each country's laws can only offer meaningful protection
from its own government agencies. That is where those who want
reform should focus-and consider the trade-offs.
Assessing the trade-offs is not a simple task, because much is and
will remain unknown regarding the effects and effectiveness of
surveillance programs, and because there is hardly any evidence
supporting simple correlations like "less surveillance means more
privacy." Most assume that less government surveillance, intelligence
gathering and law enforcement may result in less security. But, less
government surveillance, intelligence gathering and law enforcement
could also result in a loss of net privacy if one takes into account the
fact that surveillance by foreign governments and cybercriminals will
increase. Less surveillance does not automatically result in more
privacy. Conversely, more surveillance does not automatically
Summer 2014] 901
guarantee more security-as recent security breaches and data leaks
demonstrate.
Security interests and civil liberties must be carefully balanced.
In this context, it is worth noting that to date the public has been
largely embracing or tolerating charge-free online services, big data,
and tracking; evidence is the rampant success of Web 2.0, social
media, and the Internet of Things. Consumers and employees agree
every day to share massive amounts of personal data via various
forms of tracking and surveillance technologies with companies that
notify consumers and employees they should not expect privacy. In
such open, limited-privacy segments of cyberspace, the government
seems justified to emphasize security and patrol virtual worlds like
city roads and public places. If and when individuals take steps to
protect their privacy online to similar degrees as traditionally in the
sanctity of their homes-for example, with paid, secure services-the
government may become more pressed to respect this and give
privacy a greater weight in the balancing act with security interests.
Trying to differentiate between foreign and domestic spying in
cyberspace seems impractical, given the technological and social
realities in today's connected global world. Even differentiating
between war and peacetime has become difficult lately. Reform in
this regard seems necessary to re-establish the boundaries of the rules
of engagement for cyberintelligence gathering based upon war
powers. In the meantime, more easily achievable goals could be to
(1) focus on enhancing the government's data security measures to
reduce data leaks, security concerns, and diplomatic tensions caused
by public embarrassment; (2) bolster procedural and organizational
safeguards at government agencies tasked with surveillance, as with
the recent appointment of a privacy officer at the NSA; (3) redraw
the rules for cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, permitting information sharing only in clearly enumerated
cases of extreme and immediate threats to national security; and (4)
closely monitor law enforcement agencies' compliance with data
privacy laws-while accepting that spies will be spies in war and
peace and cyberspace.
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